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We consider the impact of both cyclical and structural changes in the fiscal stance on 
public spending composition for a panel of EU countries, including individual 
components of public investment. We find that both cyclically-induced and structural 
changes in the fiscal stance affect the composition of public spending, with fiscal 
tightening of both types increasing the relative share of investment and loosening 
favouring consumption expenditure. Of the components of public investment, 
infrastructure and redistribution respond to cyclical changes in the fiscal stance, while 
investment in hospitals and schools responds most clearly to structural changes. 
 
 
 21. Introduction 
 
The composition of public spending has been changing in Europe and in OECD 
countries over the past decades, as the share of public investment has declined while 
that of other spending categories has increased. As discussed in detail in Section 2, a 
number of explanations have been offered in earlier literature to account for this 
stylised fact. The longer-term decline in the share of public investment has been 
attributed to structural fiscal consolidation efforts, in part linked to the establishment 
of fiscal rules in the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Shorter-term 
changes in the relative shares have, in turn, been explained by the different cyclical 
characteristics of public investment and other expenditures, with cyclical downturns 
generally associated with a decline in the relative share of investment and cyclical 
upturns with an increase in it.    
While there is, then, clearly a link between different types of changes in the 
fiscal stance and the composition of public spending, our understanding of that link 
remains incomplete. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical work has been 
undertaken to examine systematically the link between structural versus cyclical 
changes in the fiscal stance and the composition of public spending.  
While we seek to fill that gap in this paper, we also wish to take the 
opportunity to address two additional and related questions. First, are there 
asymmetries between episodes of fiscal consolidation and relaxation as regards their 
impact on the composition of public expenditure? Some earlier work reviewed in this 
paper suggests that there might be; however, there has been no formal empirical 
investigation into this question. Second, how has the decline in the relative share of 
public investment affected its composition? In other words, have some components of 
 3public investment reacted more strongly to structural and cyclical changes in the fiscal 
stance than others? 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify two issues related to the 
terminology used in the remainder of the paper. First, the terms “public investment 
(spending)” and “government investment (spending)” will be used interchangeably, as 
is customary in related literature. However, as pointed out by Gonzalez Alegre et al. 
(2008), government investment comprises gross fixed asset formation by the general 
government, while public investment also includes investment in government-owned 
corporations, such as many utilities. Thus, although we succumb to custom and 
frequently refer to public investment (spending) below, our sole focus is on 
government investment (spending).  
Second, as will become clear in next section, earlier studies have examined 
public expenditure composition in a number of different ways, relating the evolution 
of public investment to other spending categories such as public consumption 
expenditure, primary spending, current expenditure, or even total outlays. Our focus 
will be on the relationship between investment and consumption spending, both 
because that is the economically most relevant comparison and because consumption 
is most similar to investment as a policy maker’s decision variable; thus, by focusing 
on consumption rather than, e.g., current spending we reduce unwelcome noise due to 
inherent differences between the components constituting our dependent variable.   
These caveats duly noted, we proceed to a review of earlier related literature 
(section 2). Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, section 4 interprets the results 
and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 42. Related literature 
 
It is, indeed, a well-established stylised fact that the composition of public spending 
has been changing in the past two to three decades, with the relative weight of public 
investment declining. Straub and Tchakarov (2007) document a downtrend in the ratio 
of public investment to public consumption spending in 12 EU countries since the 
1970s, owing both to a decline in public investment (relative to GDP) and an increase 
in consumption spending (also relative to GDP). Oxley and Martin (1991) confirm the 
same for OECD countries between the early 1970s and the early 1990s.   
The observation that public investment has been declining in relative terms is 
robust to the choice of denominator. Thus, de Haan et al. (1996) and Gali and Perotti 
(2003) consider public investment in relation to total public expenditure in OECD 
countries, confirming the relative decline of public investment. Balassone and Franco 
(2000) establish the decline of public investment in relation to primary (non-interest) 
outlays in EU countries during the 1990s.  
There are three different types of explanations to the observed change in the 
composition of public spending. First, public investment is perceived an easier target 
politically for cut-backs during times of fiscal stringency or, put differently, during 
episodes of tightening in structural fiscal balances. To quote Oxley and Martin (1991, 
p. 161); 
Most countries have offset such increases [in interest payments, social security 
transfers and public consumption] by winding back public investment, reflecting the 
political reality that it is easier to cut-back or postpone investment spending than it is 
to cut current expenditures. 
 
 5De Haan et al. (1996) draw the same conclusion based on an empirical study 
of 22 OECD countries during the period 1980-1992. They examine the impact of both 
political and economic factors of the ratio of public investment to total outlays 
finding, notably, that a tightening of the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit has a 
significant negative impact on that ratio. They comment on this result by suggesting 
that investment is “… politically an easier target for cuts than other spending 
categories” (p. 71). 
A second explanation to the relative decline in public investment concerns the 
role of fiscal rules, notably the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) in the EU. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) suggest that the Pact contains a 
“serious error” in the way public investment is accounted for, depressing it unduly. 
Balassone and Franco (2000) argue along similar lines, observing that the ratio of 
public investment to primary outlays declined in the EU during the 1990s, most 
notably during episodes of “lasting and significant deficit reduction.” Gali and Perotti 
(2003) differ, pointing out that the relative decline of public investment started well 
before the Maastrict Treaty and the SGP.  
Instead, Gali and Perotti (2003) emphasise the pro-cyclicality of public 
investment, which constitutes the third and final explanation of changes in the 
composition of public spending. While cyclical ups and downs cannot account for any 
long-run trends in the relative shares of public spending categories, they can, in 
principle, explain some of the observed shifts, especially in studies covering short 
(less than a full cycle) sample periods. Indeed, Lane (2003) studies the cyclicality of 
spending categories and their determinants based on a sample of 22 OECD countries 
during 1960-98 and finds that public investment is the most pro-cyclical spending 
category in the vast majority of old EU member states, with the notable exception of 
 6the UK. He also finds that current spending is counter-cyclical in most EU countries, 
which implies that the ratio of public investment to current spending tends to increase 
in cyclical upturns and decrease in downturns.   
In sum, earlier related literature has established the relative decline of public 
investment as a stylised fact, be the denominator public consumption spending, 
primary expenditure, current spending, or total outlays. Explanations to this change in 
the composition of public spending have featured the relative political ease of cutting 
back investment in times of structural fiscal consolidations; the role played by fiscal 
rules especially in Europe; and the cyclical behaviour of different spending categories. 
However, what remains missing is the “big picture” of how different types of 
changes in the fiscal stance affect public expenditure composition. Earlier studies 
suggest that structural changes, fiscal rules, and cyclical swings all may play a role, 
but they do not offer a formal encompassing test of the size and magnitude of the 
various factors. In addition, they do not address possible asymmetries between fiscal 
ups and downs in terms of their impact on expenditure composition, nor do they 
consider which components of public investment have been most affected. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Model and estimation methodology 
 
The stylized facts, established in the earlier literature, of how the composition of 
public spending has evolved suggest that the relationship between public investment 
and consumption expenditure has been characterised by a steady change. While the 
available data do not allow us to analyse its long-term determinants, we can make use 
 7of the observation that the ratio of public investment to consumption expenditure has 
been declining steadily—that is, the ratio has shown some persistence over time
1—
and specify the dynamic model in reduced form as follows: 
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(1) 
where uit  i.i.d (0, 
2), with subscript i referring to observations in the cross-section 
dimension (individual countries) and t to observations in the time dimension. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of public investment to public consumption 
spending. We consider both aggregate public investment and different types of public 
investment in the numerator, as explained below in detail.  
Our variables of interest are collected in the second and third terms of (1). The 
first term on the right-hand side of (1) contains the lagged dependent variable. The 
second term captures the impact of cyclical changes in the fiscal balance: NLCC 
denotes the cyclical component of net lending by the general government, so ΔNLCC 
measures cyclical tightening (ΔNLCC > 0) or loosening (ΔNLCC < 0) of the fiscal 
stance. CU is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 whenever there is cyclical 
tightening (ΔNLCC > 0), so it captures any asymmetry between cyclical tightening 
and loosening that there may be. We consider both the contemporaneous and lagged 
impact of cyclical changes in the fiscal stance; hence the inclusion of lags (m). 
Similarly, ΔNLCA denotes cyclically adjusted changes in the fiscal stance. 
More specifically, we are interested in structural changes in net lending, not in other 
                                                 
1 The first-order autocorrelation of that ratio in our sample, described in detail in section 3.2, is as high 
as 0.874. 
 8non-cyclical changes such as one-off or random ups and downs. DT is a dummy 
capturing any asymmetries between structural tightenings and loosenings.  
The fourth term on the right-hand side contains a number (p) of control 
variables X. Their role is simply to render the model empirically well-specified, and 
we do not seek to give them any economic interpretation. The selection of controls is 
based on earlier empirical literature summarised in section 2, and we pay special 
attention to testing the robustness of our results with respect to them (section 3.4). 
The estimation of (1) will have to account for the correlation between the 
regressors (lagged dependent) and the composite error term (i + uit) where γi denotes 
country-specific random effects, which renders least squares estimators inconsistent 
even asymptotically. To circumvent this problem we employ the General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
2 To that end, we need to 
specify a set of moment conditions using instruments that are orthogonal to the error 
term. Assuming that the error term is not serially correlated and that the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous, higher-order lags of the dependent variable constitute 
valid instruments. (Higher-order) lags of other, possibly endogenous, explanatory 
variables can also be used as instruments under the same assumptions. 
While identification requires the number of instruments to equal the number of 
explanatory variables, overidentification is in practice necessary, as it both allows the 
testing of the moment conditions and improves efficiency. There is, however, a 
possible trade-off between bias and efficiency when the number of instruments 
(moment conditions) is increased with small samples like ours (see, e.g. Roodman, 
2007). We employ the Sargan overidentification test, together with a consideration of 
                                                 
2 Note that the estimation is done in first differences, eliminating the constant term as well as any fixed 
effects from (1). 
 9the robustness of coefficient estimates to different instrument sets, as a criterion to 




The dataset consists of a panel of 10 EU member states,
3 with annual data for the 
period 1990-2006. Due to the fact that our panel is unbalanced, the total number of 
observations is 125. 
The ratio of public investment to public consumption expenditure is depicted 
in Figure 1. That ratio is, on average, about 0.1, which seems high at the outset, given 
that total government expenditure in our sample is roughly 50 percent of GDP while 
investment only amounts to some 2.5 percent of GDP. While we consider government 
investment as is customary (gross fixed capital formation of the general government), 
our focus on government consumption means that some categories of current 
spending, such as interest payments and some subsidies and transfers, are excluded 
from our denominator. 
More specifically, and following Straub and Tchakarov (2007), we employ the 
variable “final consumption expenditure of the general government,” as defined in the 
UN System of National Accounts, to account for governments’ true consumption 
spending. It comprises non-market output and in-kind social transfers related to 
expenditure on products supplied to households via market producers. Following that 
definition, final consumption expenditure amounts on average to 25 percent of GDP 
in our sample.  
                                                 
3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. 
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Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations. 
 
When considering different types of government investment in the numerator 
of the dependent variable, we employ the breakdown introduced in Kappeler and 
Välilä (2008) into investment in infrastructure, schools and hospitals, public goods, 
and redistribution. All data on government investment are obtained from Eurostat, 
while the data on government consumption originates from the OECD. 
Turning then to our variables of interest, we use data on the cyclical and 
discretionary components of net lending as provided by the OECD, with some 
modification. The methodology for calculating them is explained in Girouard and 
André (2005). In brief, the cyclically adjusted component (NLCA) is obtained by 
estimating and removing the cyclical components of government revenues and 
expenditures. This implies that the cyclically adjusted component contains not only 
the structural budget balance—which is of key interest to us—but that it also contains 
 11other non-cyclical components, including one-off and random changes in government 
revenues and expenditures.
4 As a consequence, NLCA displays high volatility, in 
many cases jumping back and forth between positive and negative values year after 
year. To mitigate this problem and to obtain a better approximation of the structural 
budget balance, we smooth the reported NLCA series using the Hodric-Prescott filter 
(λ = 100). Both NLCC and NLCA are measured relative to potential GDP. 
Finally, the selection of control variables is based on earlier literature (see 
section 2), complemented with other plausible variables (see section 3.4 on robustness 
testing). In the end, the set of significant controls include log real GDP per capita 
(source OECD); public debt relative to GDP (source Ameco); external trade balance 
relative to GDP (source OECD); the long-term interest rate on government bonds 
(source OECD); and a dummy variable indicating EMU participation. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the 
estimation. Panel unit root test results are reported in Annex 1, including both the 
Levin, Lin and Chu test assuming homogeneity in the individual unit root processes, 
and the Im, Pesaran and Shin test allowing for individual heterogeneity in the unit root 
processes. Both tests confirm that all variables are difference stationary. Annex 2 
reports correlation coefficients between right-hand side variables. They are 
appropriately low, with the obvious exception of correlations between cyclical and 
structural changes in net lending and the corresponding dummies for cyclical and 
structural tightening. To ensure that the results are robust to these high correlations, 
we estimate specifications both with and without the dummies. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Gali and Perotti (2003) refer to the “systematic or endogenous” component of the cyclically adjusted 
balance and the “non-systematic or exogenous” component without, however, distinguishing between 
them in the empirical analysis. 
 123.3 Results 
 
In this section we report the estimation results for the preferred specification of the 
model (1). The robustness of the results to different variables treated as endogenous in 
the estimation; to different sets of control variables; and to a different number of 
instruments is discussed in section 3.4. Also, only the statistically significant 
coefficient estimates for different lags of our variables of interest are reported. The 
interpretation of the results from an economic perspective is done in section 4. 
 13Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the data 
N mean sd min max
IC 148 0.106 0.032 0.031 0.202
IC_g1 148 0.035 0.016 0.010 0.077
IC_g2 148 0.023 0.009 0.008 0.062
IC_g3 148 0.027 0.011 -0.034 0.061
IC_g4 148 0.020 0.011 -0.010 0.056
NLCC 148 -0.232 1.112 -5.278 3.245
ΔNLCC 145 -0.013 0.853 -3.428 3.380
NLCA 148 -1.801 2.712 -12.163 6.268
ΔNLCA 145 0.242 0.649 -2.873 4.721
CU 145 0.538 0.500 0.000 1.000
DT 145 0.848 0.360 0.000 1.000
log(GDP) 148 8.569 3.151 4.254 12.587
DebtGDP 148 0.678 0.271 0.140 1.340
IR 148 6.084 2.383 3.351 13.536
ExpImp 148 0.030 0.033 -0.032 0.115
EMU 148 0.615 0.488 0.000 1.000  
Note: IC is the ratio of public investment to public consumption expenditure, the variables IC_gi,     
i=1,…,4 correspond to the components of public investment, with i=1 being infrastructure; i=2 
hospitals and schools; i=3 public goods (including defence, order and safety, environment); and i=4 
redistribution (including recreation and social housing). NLCC is a cyclical component of net lending, 
NLCA is cyclically adjusted net lending, CU is the dummy for cyclical tightening, and DT is the 
dummy for structural tightening. DebtGDP is the public debt ratio (to GDP), IR denotes the long-term 
interest rate on government bonds, ExpImp is the trade balance (relative to GDP), and EMU is the 
EMU dummy. 
 
Table 2 shows the estimation results with the ratio of aggregate public 
investment to consumption expenditure in value terms as a dependent variable. In the 
preferred specification the variable GDP is considered endogenous; the only control 
variables are trade openness (as in Lane, 2003); public debt to GDP (as in Kappeler 
and Välilä, 2008); and the number of lags of the dependent and GDP used as 
instruments is 5. Specification A excludes the dummies CU and DT, seeking to 
capture any asymmetries between fiscal tightening and loosening. Specification B 
only considers cyclical fiscal changes, while specification C only considers structural 
 14changes. Specification D includes all variables of interest. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that some of them are highly correlated with one another.  
  
 15Table 2. Estimation results with the ratio of public investment to consumption 
expenditure (value) as dependent variable. 
ABCD
coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value
ICt-1 0.4005 0.4240 0.4037 0.3986
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log(GDP)t (endog.) 0.0915 0.1369 0.1161 0.1311
(0.2829) (0.1074) (0.1794) (0.1265)
log(GDP)t-1 (endog.) -0.1479 -0.1902 -0.1696 -0.1939
(0.1006) (0.0348) (0.0641) (0.0325)
ΔNLCCt-1 0.0015 0.0037 0.0033
(0.1726) (0.0084) (0.0219)






DebtGDPt-1 -0.0395 -0.0361 -0.0357 -0.0442
(0.0209) (0.0365) (0.0324) (0.0114)
ExpImpt -0.1120 -0.1051 -0.1158 -0.1208
(0.0475) (0.0549) (0.0374) (0.0284)
Number of observations 125 125 125 125
Sargan test (p-value) 0.6341 0.5671 0.7107 0.7113
AR1 (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AR2 (p-value) 0.6877 0.7822 0.6188 0.6928
lags 5555  
Note: IC is the ratio of public investment to public consumption expenditure, NLCC is the cyclical 
component of net lending, NLCA is cyclically adjusted net lending, CU is the dummy for cyclical 
tightening, DT is the dummy for structural tightening, DebtGDP is the public debt ratio (to GDP), and 
ExpImp is the trade balance (relative to GDP). 
 
Consider first the impact of cyclical and structural changes in net lending on 
the composition of public spending. As shown in Table 2, only the first lags of these 
variables are statistically significant. Both have positive coefficients, suggesting that 
cyclical and structural fiscal tightening (increase in net lending) is associated with an 
increase in public investment relative to consumption expenditure in the following 
 16year. Conversely, cyclical and structural loosening (decrease in net lending) is 
associated with a decrease in the relative share of public investment the year after. 
The coefficient estimates are robust in terms of significance and magnitude; 
only in specification A is the coefficient for cyclical changes in net lending 
insignificant. In all other specifications a one-percentage point of GDP increase 
(decrease) in net lending leads roughly to a 0.3 percentage point increase (decrease) in 
the ratio of public investment to consumption expenditure. Recalling that the average 
ratio in our sample is about 10 percent, a one-percentage point of GDP tightening 
would then increase the relative share of investment by some 3 percent.  
  The structural tightening/loosening dummy DT is insignificant, so there are no 
asymmetries between structural tightening and loosening of the fiscal stance. 
However, the cyclical tightening/loosening dummy CU is significant (albeit only at 
the 10 percent level) and negative, which implies that the increase in the investment-
to-consumption ratio following a cyclical tightening is smaller than the decrease in 
that ratio following a cyclical loosening. In other words, the relative gain in 
investment following a cyclical tightening is smaller than the relative gain in 
consumption following a loosening.  
Moving then to consider how the individual components of public investment 
move relative to public consumption expenditure, Table 3 reports the estimation 
results with each of the four components as the numerator of the dependent variable in 
turn. We now consider public debt (relative to GDP) as endogenous, and we also add 
the EMU dummy and the long-term government interest rate as control variables in 
some cases. The preferred number of lags used as instruments varies between 2 and 5.     
The relative share of infrastructure investment behaves as aggregate public 
investment, with cyclical and structural tightening (loosening) increasing (decreasing) 
 17it relative to consumption expenditure, with no observable asymmetries present. That 
infrastructure investment and aggregate public investment behave similarly is no 
surprise given that infrastructure is the single biggest component in aggregate 
investment, accounting for about one-third of it (Kappeler and Välilä, 2008).  
Investment in hospitals and schools increases (decreases) relative to 
consumption expenditure following a structural tightening (loosening) of the fiscal 
stance, while it does not react significantly to cyclical changes. In addition, the 
reaction to structural changes is symmetric; the gain in investment in hospitals and 
schools following a tightening is similar to the gain in consumption following a 
loosening. 
While investment in public goods does not seem to react systematically to 
either cyclical or structural changes in the fiscal stance, there is some evidence that it 
increases contemporaneously relative to consumption expenditure following a cyclical 
tightening (the coefficient for the CU dummy is significant and positive). 
Finally, redistribution investment gains relative to consumption expenditure 
following cyclical tightening and loses following a loosening, with no significant 
asymmetry observable. 
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Table 3. Estimation results with the ratio of components of public investment to 














DebtGDPt (endog.) -0.0183 -0.0163 -0.0458 0.0025
(0.0873) (0.0379) (0.0337) (0.8856)
DebtGDPt-1 (endog.) -0.0007 0.0098 0.0094 -0.0083
(0.9419) (0.1669) (0.6378) (0.5626)








log(GDP)t -0.0234 -0.0163 -0.0742 -0.0179







Number of observations 125 125 128 125
Sargan test (p-value) 0.1513 0.2018 0.6101 0.8094
AR1 (p-value) 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
AR2 (p-value) 0.2735 0.9412 0.5605 0.9748
lags 235 2  
Note: The variables IC_gi, i=1,…,4 correspond to the components of public investment, with i=1 being 
infrastructure; i=2 hospitals and schools; i=3 public goods (including defence, order and safety, 
environment); and i=4 redistribution (including recreation and social housing). NLCC is cyclical 
component of net lending, NLCA is cyclically adjusted net lending, CU is the dummy for cyclical 
 19tightening, DebtGDP is the public debt ratio (to GDP), IR denotes the long-term interest rate on 
government bonds, ExpImp is the trade balance (relative to GDP), and EMU is the EMU dummy. 
 
In terms of magnitudes of the estimated effects, infrastructure investment 
reacts more strongly in absolute terms to cyclical swings in the fiscal stance than 
investment in either hospitals and schools or redistribution.  
In sum, we find no evidence that fiscal tightening (decrease in net lending) of 
any kind would reduce the share of public investment relative to consumption 
expenditure. On the contrary, cyclical tightening boosts the relative share of 
investment in infrastructure; hospitals and schools; and redistribution, while structural 
tightening boosts the relative share of investment in hospitals and schools. However, 
we have found some evidence that the gain in investment as a result of a fiscal 
tightening is smaller than the gain in consumption following a fiscal loosening. 
 
3.4 Robustness testing 
 
The results reported above are based on a reduced-form model specification that 
could, in principle, exert a significant impact on the estimation results. To assure the 
robustness of the results to such influences, we consider in this section a number of 
alternative specifications and modelling choices. 
To start with the specification of the dependent variable, we note that the 
numerator and the denominator were measured above in value terms; that is, we used 
the original observations, rather than any transformation of them. As both variables 
are also available in volume (real) terms, we estimate (1) using them. The results are 
reported in Table 4. To render the estimated model well-specified, we treat debt (to 
GDP) as endogenous and consider 5 lags as instruments. We also include the long-
 20term government interest rate as a control variable, given that there was some 
evidence of its significance (see Table 3).  
Cyclical changes in the fiscal stance have now turned out to be insignificant, 
but there is still some evidence of a decrease in the ratio of investment to consumption 
expenditure following a cyclical tightening. However, the coefficient for CUt-1 
(dummy for cyclical tightening) is only significant at the 10 percent level, so that 
evidence is weak.  
Structural changes in the fiscal stance remain significant, with a tightening 
(loosening) associated with an increase (decrease) in the ratio of investment to 
consumption spending. Moreover, the coefficient for DTt-1 (dummy for structural 
tightening) is now significant (it was negative but insignificant in Table 2), suggesting 
that the response of the ratio to a fiscal tightening is smaller than it is to a fiscal 
loosening. 
 21 
Table 4. Estimation results with the ratio of public investment to consumption 
expenditure (volume) as dependent variable. 
ABCD
coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value
ICt-1 0.6066 0.6139 0.5658 0.5722
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DebtGDPt (endog.) 0.0131 0.0022 0.0176 0.0075
(0.7068) (0.9478) (0.5973) (0.8271)
DebtGDPt-1 (endog.) -0.0203 -0.0038 -0.0202 -0.0081
(0.5357) (0.9054) (0.4989) (0.8058)
ΔNLCCt-1 -0.0004 0.0014 0.0010
(0.7303) (0.3448) (0.5067)






log(GDP)t 0.0023 0.0082 0.0069 0.0113
(0.9296) (0.7557) (0.7934) (0.6658)
ExpImpt -0.1618 -0.1641 -0.1554 -0.1612
(0.0177) (0.0147) (0.0245) (0.0125)
IRt -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.5968) (0.8131) (0.4086) (0.6217)
Number of observations 139 139 139 139
Sargan test (p-value) 0.7487 0.7227 0.9143 0.9180
AR1 (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AR2 (p-value) 0.8513 0.8485 0.5676 0.5702
lags 5555  
Note: IC is the ratio of public investment to public consumption expenditure, NLCC is cyclical 
component of net lending, NLCA is cyclically adjusted net lending, CU is the dummy for cyclical 
tightening, DT is the dummy for structural tightening, DebtGDP is the public debt ratio (to GDP), IR 
denotes the long-term interest rate on government bonds, and ExpImp is the trade balance (relative to 
GDP). 
 
A second robustness test we carried out concerns the set of control variables. 
As shown in the tables above, only trade openness is systematically significant (as in 
Lane, 2003); the long-term government interest rate or the EMU dummy are not 
 22systematically significant. We also considered a number of other controls that one or 
the other earlier study has found significant. Additional controls considered but found 
predominantly insignificant in our case include population, population growth, 
population density, unemployment rate, foreign direct investment inflows, and various 
measures of urbanisation.  
We also considered alternative choices of right-hand side variables treated as 
endogenous, as well as alternative numbers of lags of the dependent and the 
endogenous variables used as instruments. While we do not consider endogeneity of 
explanatory variables a major issue (after all, most of them are lagged and hence 
predetermined), the contemporaneous values of GDP and public debt (to GDP) are 
candidates for being endogenous. We thus considered both of them jointly and each of 
them individually as endogenous, and selected the specification suggested best by the 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Relatedly, the number of lags included was 
selected with the trade-off between bias and efficiency in mind: in our case increasing 
the number of lags led invariably to significant changes in the coefficient estimates, 
suggesting that bias may be an issue. This being the case, we opted for a small 
number of lags, subject to them passing the Sargan test. 
 
4. Economic interpretation of the results 
 
Our key results can be summarised as follows: 
  Structural tightening of the fiscal stance increases public investment relative to 
consumption expenditure with a lag of one year, while a structural loosening 
reduces the relative share of investment with a similar lag. There is some evidence 
that the gain in investment following a tightening is smaller than the gain in 
 23  Cyclical changes in the fiscal stance have a similar impact, although the evidence 
is less robust to the measurement (values or volumes) of investment and 
consumption expenditure. The components of investment responsible for the 
cyclical movements include infrastructure and redistribution (such as social 
housing). 
These results stand in clear contrast to some of those in earlier literature, which 
concluded that the relative ease in cutting investment in episodes of fiscal stringency 
and/or because of the fiscal rules embedded in Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact both have exerted downward pressure on the ratio of public investment 
to consumption expenditure. To repeat, our results suggest that structural fiscal 
tightening tends to increase, not reduce, public investment relative to consumption 
expenditure. We also find no evidence that EMU’s fiscal rules would have exerted 
any significant impact on the composition of public spending. 
 
However, we do find some support for the findings of Lane (2003), suggesting 
that the different cyclical patterns of public investment and current spending imply an 
increase in the ratio between them during cyclical upturns and a decline in downturns. 
Again, we found a cyclical fiscal tightening (i.e., an upturn in the business cycle) 
increasing the ratio, while a cyclical loosening (i.e., a cyclical downturn) reduces it.  
There are obvious differences between this and earlier studies that render them 
only incompletely comparable. The samples differ, with ours covering a decade or 
more of observations than any of the earlier studies. We also limit the analysis to 
European countries, while most earlier studies consider a more heterogeneous group 
 24of OECD countries. The model specification and estimation methodologies differ, too, 
as we seek to present an encompassing analysis of the impact of both cyclical and 
structural changes on the composition of public spending, instead of just considering 
one of these aspects in isolation.  
In any case, our results underline how incompletely the relationship between 
changes in the fiscal stance and the composition of public spending is understood. The 
results related to cyclical changes in the fiscal stance and in the composition of public 
expenditure seem least controversial, but we can only speculate about why cyclical 
upturns tend to increase the relative share of public investment in infrastructure and 
redistribution at the expense of consumption expenditure. Automatic stabilisers are 
likely to play a role, reducing social transfers and public consumption. The cyclicality 
of the components of public investment and its determinants have not been addressed 
in earlier literature, so we can only consider the observed cyclicality of infrastructure 
and redistribution investment as a stylised fact waiting to be explained in future 
research.    
An arguably more intriguing finding is the observed behaviour of public 
spending composition following structural changes in the fiscal stance. Especially, 
why does investment in hospitals and schools gain in relative terms following 
structural fiscal tightening and loses, again in relative terms, following a structural 
relaxation? Part of the explanation may again lie in the denominator, with structural 
changes affecting consumption spending. Indeed, the literature on the success of fiscal 
consolidations (see European Commission, 2007, for a survey) emphasises the 
importance of current spending cuts for their success. However, our sample includes 
all types of consolidation (as well as structural relaxation) episodes, and whether 
successful (however defined) consolidations have a different impact on public 
 25spending composition than unsuccessful ones is another topic for future research to 
tackle. 
Many studies have emphasised the importance of political determinants for 
aggregate public investment, and perhaps the differences between the components of 
public investment in their reaction to structural (and also cyclical) changes in the 
fiscal stance are indeed linked to such political factors. There is no obvious economic 
reason why investment in hospitals and schools should be more responsive to 
structural fiscal changes (or why investment in infrastructure should be more 
responsive to cyclical changes). However, a challenge for finding political-economy 
explanations for the results obtained here is that the direction and pattern of observed 
changes is so counter-intuitive. After all, what kind of a political objective function 
could imply support for children (schools) rather than, e.g., poor voters (social 




Both cyclically-induced and structural changes in the fiscal stance affect the 
composition of public spending, with fiscal tightening of both types increasing the 
relative share of investment and loosening favouring consumption expenditure. There 
is, however, some asymmetry in that the gain in investment following a tightening 
tends to be smaller than the gain in consumption expenditure following a loosening. 
Of the components of public investment, infrastructure and redistribution respond to 
cyclical changes in the fiscal stance, while investment in hospitals and schools 
responds most clearly to structural changes. 
 26The results pertaining to the impact of cyclical changes are in line with earlier 
literature and more intuitive economically. To fully understand the observed results 
on structural fiscal changes requires further research, possibly including political-
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Annex 1. Unit root test results 
       Levin, Lin, Chu  Im, Pesaran & Shin 
   stationarity  N statistics p-value statistics p-value 
IC level 134 -6.725 0.000 -5.397 0.000 
   difference  121 -8.560 0.000 -6.688 0.000 
IC_g1 level  133 -3.240 0.001 -3.171 0.001 
   difference  124 -7.639 0.000 -6.475 0.000 
IC_g2 level  129 -5.898 0.000 -4.382 0.000 
   difference  122 -10.714 0.000 -8.034 0.000 
IC_g3 level  132 -11.689 0.000 -5.982 0.000 
   difference  122 -10.911 0.000 -8.618 0.000 
IC_g4 level  136 -4.169 0.000 -2.746 0.003 
   difference  126 -9.338 0.000 -6.702 0.000 
ΔNLCC level  130 -5.995 0.000 -5.302 0.000 
   difference  121 -9.312 0.000 -7.235 0.000 
ΔNLCA level  118 -6.245 0.000 -11.732 0.000 
   difference  114 -6.999 0.000 -8.273 0.000 
log(GDP) level  133 -1.786 0.037 1.981 0.976 
   difference  126 -5.254 0.000 -3.966 0.000 
DebtGDP level  129 -0.135 0.446 0.154 0.561 
   difference  124 -4.180 0.000 -2.705 0.003 
IR level 135 -5.096 0.000 -2.064 0.020 
   difference  124 -8.047 0.000 -6.390 0.000 
ExpImp level  135 0.470 0.681 2.939 0.998 
   difference  126 -7.969 0.000 -5.411 0.000 
 
Note: Automatic selection of lags by AIC. IC is the ratio of public investment to public consumption 
expenditure, the variables IC_gi, i=1,…,4 correspond to the components of public investment, with i=1 
being infrastructure; i=2 hospitals and schools; i=3 public goods (including defence, order and safety, 
environment); and i=4 redistribution (including recreation and social housing). NLCC is a cyclical 
component of net lending, NLCA is cyclically adjusted net lending, DebtGDP is the public debt ratio 
(to GDP), IR denotes the long-term interest rate on government bonds, and ExpImp is the trade balance 
(relative to GDP). 
 Annex 2. Correlation matrix 
ΔNLCCt ΔNLCCt-1 ΔNLCAt ΔNLCAt-1 CUt CUt-1 DTt DTt-1 log(GDP)t IRt ExpImpt EMUt
ΔNLCCt 1
ΔNLCCt-1 0.201 1
ΔNLCAt 0.335 0.231 1
ΔNLCAt-1 0.193 0.321 0.162 1
CUt 0.695 0.193 0.246 0.086 1
CUt-1 0.328 0.696 0.184 0.238 0.282 1
DTt 0.220 0.179 0.515 0.208 0.225 0.105 1
DTt-1 0.103 0.160 0.152 0.508 0.114 0.157 0.659 1
log(GDP)t 0.094 0.099 0.032 0.025 0.052 0.050 0.284 0.264 1
IRt -0.167 -0.107 -0.021 -0.058 -0.081 -0.002 -0.121 -0.174 -0.195 1
ExpImpt 0.121 0.040 0.164 0.140 0.071 0.007 0.141 0.106 0.225 -0.259 1
EMUt 0.056 -0.029 0.089 0.077 0.059 -0.034 0.112 0.093 -0.443 -0.365 0.058 1 
Note: NLCC is a cyclical component of net lending, NLCA is cyclically adjusted net lending, CU is the dummy for cyclical tightening, DT is the dummy for structural 
tightening, IR denotes the long-term interest rate on government bonds, ExpImp is the trade balance (relative to GDP), and EMU is the EMU dummy. 
 